ABSTRACT The sequence comparison of large-scale string-typed data is fundamental in computer science and other computational disciplines. Its development has been promoted into an emerging outsourcing service by the almost unlimited powerful computing and storage capabilities from public clouds. The privacy preservation and effective utility of the outsourced sensitive information are key requirements now facing this service. All of the secure two-party computation protocols in existing solutions, however, cannot be free from the assumption of non-colluding servers under multi-server models, and thus fail to defend against some attacks from cloud service providers. For this reason, we present encrypted sequence comparison (E-SC), the first security system that works by executing encrypted sequence comparison under a single-server model. Two character sequences are encrypted by end users before outsourcing, while the encrypted character sequences are compared directly by a single cloud server to return their similarity results. To accomplish this goal, novel computable encryption algorithms are designed in this paper. Then, a collusion-resistant outsourcing is achieved using non-interactive padding, partition, and expansion mechanisms. Results of simulation experiments demonstrate that the client-side overhead is quadratic in the input number of salt values, along with an optimal server-side performance. Also, the overall runtime of our E-SC system is positively correlated with its security level, which is more practical in realistic applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sequence comparison algorithm, which works to offer a convincing metric to measure the degree of the similarity between character sequences (i.e., strings), is currently considered as one of the most essential and important stringtyped data operations. So far this algorithm has been widely used in data mining, artificial intelligence, genetic diagnosis, homology analysis, and other applications. It has greatly promoted the research and discovery of some key fields, such as information science, bioscience and so on.
Over the past decades, there have been unprecedented technological advances with regard to internet industry and distributed storage, leading to large-scale datasets. However, this explosive growth of string-typed information is a mixed blessing [1] , [2] . On the one hand, the enormous amounts of data are helpful when exploring new insights into the hidden information or the association rules from a variety of perspectives. On the other hand, the generated data are so massive that the sequence comparison has become a very expensive computation, which is far more than our traditional environment can undertake.
One possible solution is to migrate character sequences to public cloud computing platforms and to request that Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) process sequence comparisons. At present, primary sequence comparison algorithms are deployed as a universal outsourcing service on public clouds. But at the same time, its security and privacy issues are increasingly emerging. The outsourced data stored as plaintext could easily be exposed to malicious external intruders and internal attackers in the CSP, and the individual private information carried by character sequences (e.g., personal identification, financial transaction records, genetic markers for some diseases, information that is used to identify paternity or maternity, etc.) could more or less be disclosed or abused [2] , [3] . Therefore, secure outsourcing is designed to protect the privacy of character sequences, and to ensure that the scheduled computing requests are normally performed on the cloud servers.
Computable cryptographic techniques, which have the capability to preserve data secrecy and data usability, are the best choice right now for achieving secure outsourcing of sequence comparison. The character sequences are encrypted before being outsourced to the CSP, and the comparison results are decrypted after being sent back from the CSP. In recent years, academia and industry have already proposed several encryption schemes, which fall into three categories: homomorphic encryption [4] - [9] , garbled circuit [10] - [15] , and oblivious transfer [16] - [21] . The computational complexity of homomorphic encryption techniques is prohibitively high, whereas the others simply split a single character sequence into two parts and then send them respectively to two cloud servers. Assuming these servers do not conspire with each other, secure two-party computation protocols can be constructed using oblivious transfer techniques. Their security in such a multi-server model is still limited by the CSP's reliability. Generally speaking, end users have to rent the outsourcing computing services from different CSPs, but because of the lack of effective measures to resist collusion, the above assumption is unlikely to hold true in practice. The server from each side may attempt to exchange its data in order to gain more economic benefits.
Once two cloud servers have launched a collusion attack, all security mechanisms would be completely useless. The character sequences, cost matrices, and sequence comparison results are, without exception, exposed to malicious cloud attackers. Therefore, the essential solution is to execute the whole process of outsourcing computing to a single cloud server. In other words, a truly practical secure outsourcing scheme should consider what level of security the users can obtain under the commonest application scenarios, instead of blindly trusting any non-colluding assumption.
For this purpose, we present a scheme called Encrypted Sequence Comparison (E-SC) based on a single-server model. Some novel salted hash and encryption techniques are employed to allow public clouds to perform sequence comparisons directly on the character sequences outsourced as ciphertext. Overall, E-SC achieves a user-controlled reliable storage and a collusion-resistant outsourcing service, which plays an important role in the trade-off between security and execution performance. Our scheme is easy in deployment, efficient in processing and controllable in overhead.
The contributions of this paper are mainly in the following four aspects.
1) Based on the universal model of a public cloud outsourcing, we propose an overall architecture for E-SC. This architecture is built on the end user and the unmodified CSP. Its overall system model, which has been demonstrated to be secure under the threat model, is user-friendly and implementation-friendly. 2) A salted hash algorithm is improved to hash the character sequences and the indexes of cost matrices, so as to defend against statistical attacks. An additive order preserving encryption algorithm is designed to encrypt the elements of cost matrices. Also, this algorithm can achieve an indistinguishability under additive ordered chosen-plaintext attack with linear time complexity. 3) A single cloud server works for the first time to provide a privacy-preserving computable outsourcing service to effectively resist collusion attacks from the cloud.
With pre-processing modules of padding, partition, and expansion, there is no need to decrypt any outsourced data in the non-interactive sequence comparison stage. 4) Simulation results show that the overall execution performance of our E-SC is negatively correlated with its security. The average computational complexities of the end user and the CSP are denoted by O(n 1 + n 2 ) + O(|W | 2 ) and O(n 1 n 2 ) respectively, where n 1 and n 2 are the lengths of the padded character sequences, and |W | represents the size of the hash value set. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Following the introduction, in Section II, the background knowledge about the sequence comparison and the system and threat model are presented. Then, in Section III, we detail two computable cipher tools. Section IV is an overview of the overall design architecture of E-SC. Its functional modules and the specific processing steps of each stage are then fully introduced. The simulation evaluation experiments and the analyses of their results are provided in Section V. Finally, we discuss the instantiations, system security, related works and our future work in Section VI, and conclude the study in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The difficulty of designing a single-server model is in determining which encryption algorithm to select and how to execute comparison on encrypted string-typed data. To this end, taking the most typical Wagner-Fischer edit distance [22] as an example, this paper proposes a collusion-resistant solution for encrypted sequence comparison. Our described conclusions can be extended to a more secure outsourcing of dynamic programming-based applications.
In this section, we give some brief preliminaries about sequence comparison algorithms. The system model is then built on the generalized procedure of sequence comparison outsourcing. Its major security threats and design objectives are also stated clearly for E-SC.
A. SEQUENCE COMPARISON ALGORITHM
A conventional sequence comparison covers two aspects, namely the computing of a string-typed edit distance and the programming of an edit path. The standard computation for the edit distance between two strings (with lengths of n 1 and n 2 ) is the dynamic programming algorithm [22] discov-VOLUME 6, 2018 ered in 1974, whose computational complexity is O(n 1 n 2 ). Let the matrix M [i, j] (0 ≤ i ≤ n 2 , 0 ≤ j ≤ n 1 ) be the minimum cost of edit operations (i.e., insert, delete or substitute) of transforming the prefix of string λ of length j into the prefix of string µ of length i, i.e., of transforming
The set is an alphabet, and for any character element a, b ∈ , I = {I 
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Based on the universal model of public cloud outsourcing, a collusion-resistant outsourcing system model of sequence comparison algorithms is shown in Fig. 1 , where arrows indicate the requests and replies between client and server. Towards application scenarios with a single-datasource, this outsourcing process is mainly composed of two roles, which can now be reformulated with more details as follows.
1) The end user is the owner of the original character sequences as well as the requester of sequence comparison services. In the case of bioinformatics, the abstract genomic sequences, in general, are regarded as a special string consisting of specific characters, and there are just four DNA bases [23] , [24] in their alphabet = {A, C, G, T }. Suppose that the end user has a character sequence λ of length n 1 (n 1 = 0) and a character sequence µ of length n 2 (n 2 = 0), he should outsource these sequences and his cost matrices of edit operations (i.e., I, D and S) to the CSP after encryption in order to protect the secrecy.
2) The CSP is the provider of sequence comparison outsourcing services, who is established on a single cloud server to receive two character sequences and three cost matrices of edit operations. It works to compute and then to return the edit distance and a set of edit path to the end user. It is assumed here that the semi-trusted CSP is an honest-but-curious adversary. Although it provides a computing service strictly within the agreed procedure, it may still actively steal the private information of end users (e.g., all or part of genomic data, conclusions about DNA or protein sequence difference analysis, etc.) for some commercial gains. The outsourcing flow of sequence comparison is shown in Fig. 1 . At any time, only encrypted cost matrices and encrypted character sequences are stored by end users to the CSP. To make sequence comparison algorithms perform as usual, every component in the system model should apply to the ciphertexts. Since both the encryption of outsourced sequences and the decryption of final computation results are done by end users, we assume that sufficient security mechanisms (e.g., access control) have been rigorously deployed, which can ensure the security of system secret keys. Furthermore, let us further suppose that there is no collusion attack in any way between end users and the CSP, so the results of outsourcing comparison of character sequences can only be obtained by end users and will probably never be disclosed to the cloud.
The possible security threat from which the system model of sequence comparison outsourcing may suffer mainly comes from the fact that the private data of end users can be maliciously taken by the CSP or third-party adversaries. It is easy for this kind of attacker to acquire encrypted character sequences and cost matrices from the cloud. Also, it has the ability to launch a ciphertext-only attack to guess keys.
E-SC is designed to preserve the secrecy of outsourced strings and the edit distance under the above threat model. It does not ensure the integrity of character sequences, the public verifiability [25] of comparison results or the secrecy of edit paths. Besides, the outsourcing computing process of E-SC should be user-friendly and implementation-friendly. The interaction between client and server is totally avoided, except necessary data transmissions.
III. CIPHER TOOL
The collusion-resistant secure outsourcing scheme for sequence comparison can draw lessons from the basic ideas of computable cryptographic techniques. A salted hash is introduced first, followed by an additive order preserving encryption. The boundary generation, encryption, decryption sub-algorithms, and their simplified versions are described in detail. Cryptographic properties are also summarized and formally proven. At the end of this section, security analyses of the two cipher tools will be provided together. Additionally, we should note that all of the below-mentioned random integers and strings are individually assigned by the 3360 VOLUME 6, 2018
Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) [26] with high security.
A. SALTED HASH ALGORITHM
Hash algorithms, whose avalanche effect and one-wayness are suitable to protect character sequences, specifically work to hash the basic characters one by one on various positions. Nevertheless, as for a character sequence, since its alphabet size may be extremely small (| | = 4 in genomic sequences) and its average length is extremely big, its hashed result always contains several of the same hash values. Moreover, there exist particular statistical characteristics in the distribution of basic characters, so the attacker can easily seize the real string-typed data according to the positions with the same character. In order to protect the storage security of outsourced data to the greatest extent, and to facilitate the search in cost matrices of edit operations, we adopt a salted hash algorithm.
A salt value is added to the original sequence for diffusion and confusion before hashing so that the hashed results are randomized. Now the hash function h(·) is defined as
where ε is the basic character to be hashed, and the HASH is a common hash algorithm, for instance, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, etc. salt represents the salt value randomly selected from a finite set Q, and Q consists of a set of randomly generated strings. Let us assume that the ratio between the size of the set and the length of the character sequence is denoted as α, i.e., α = |Q|/ max{n 1 , n 2 } ≤ 1 (|Q| ≥ | |). The length of every string in the set is consistent with the fixed length of the output in the HASH algorithm.
B. ADDITIVE ORDER PRESERVING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM (AOPE)
The construction of the matrix M in sequence comparison algorithms involves two forms of operations: numerical addition and numerical comparison. Hence, the cipher tool we select in its secure outsourcing scheme should be additive homomorphism as well as order homomorphism. A novel Additive Order Preserving Encryption (AOPE for short) algorithm, which ensures that the numerical order can still be well preserved after several ciphertexts are added together, is proposed by combining with the mathematical properties about the dynamic programming algorithms in Section II-A.
1) ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
AOPE overcomes the applicable limitation of existing order preserving techniques on aggregation operations. This algorithm adopts the structure of one-to-many mapping, where the same plaintext value is encrypted to different ciphertext values with a certain probability. The plaintext domain X is composed of a portion of non-negative integers, that is, X ⊆ N * , and its maximum plaintext value is denoted as K . The ciphertext domain Y is composed of some positive integers. Y is divided into sequential discrete randomized ciphertext partitions, and there is a mutable interval between two adjacent ciphertext partitions. Throughout the remainder of this paper, let us assume that the lower (resp. the upper) boundary of the ith partition can be written as L[i] (resp. U [i]) for easy presentation.
Our AOPE can be formally summarized as a probabilistic symmetric encryption algorithm, i.e., (BoundaryGen, Enc, Dec), including the following three sub-algorithms:
1) Boundary Generation Sub-Algorithm (Algorithm 1): The end user takes 2K + 3 randomly selected integers as the system keys (R, H and σ ), where R = {R i } (0 ≤ i ≤ K ) is a set of random non-negative integers, H = {H i } (0 ≤ i ≤ K ) is a set of random positive integers, and σ is a random positive integer with σ > max 0≤i≤K {R i } − R 0 − H 0 . Function BoundaryGen(R, H, σ ) takes these system keys as the inputs to return two finite integer sets (L and U). L contains the lower boundaries of every partition in the ciphertext domain, while U contains all of the upper boundaries.
2) Encryption Sub-Algorithm (Algorithm 2): Function Enc(m, L, U) takes the boundary sets (i.e., L and U) and a plaintext value m ∈ X as the inputs to return its corresponding ciphertext value c = E(m), where E : X → Y is the encryption function of AOPE. It can be seen from the analysis of AOPE that its decryption sub-algorithm is a reverse mapping of the encryption subalgorithm. Thus, the ciphertext can be correctly decrypted to a unique plaintext, that is,
Meanwhile, the numerical order of plaintext values is fully preserved by the AOPE algorithm. See Section III-B3 for
set D(c) = mid 7: return D(c) 8: else if c < L[mid] then 9: set right = mid − 1 10: else 11: set left = mid + 1 12: end if 13 : end while 14: set D(c) = left 15: return D(c) specific proofs. A complement to this algorithm is that AOPE can effectively encrypt and decrypt the data of arbitrary form through appropriate type and precision conversion.
2) SIMPLIFIED VERSION
The average time complexity of boundary generation subalgorithm, encryption sub-algorithm, and decryption subalgorithm is O(K 2 ), O(1), and O(log K ) respectively. So for the sake of reducing the amount of computation in the one-time algorithm BoundaryGen, the sets of random numbers R i (0 ≤ i ≤ K ) and H i (0 ≤ i ≤ K ) should be pre-sorted in a non-decreasing order. Then the following simplified boundary generation sub-algorithm is developed.
compute S = S + R t + H t 6: end for 7: return L, U From Line 3 to Line 5 in Algorithm 4, the lower and upper boundaries of the ciphertext partition can be calculated in linear time, which is proven as follows:
Theorem 1 (Linear Boundary Function): For any integer t (0 ≤ t ≤ K ), its lower and upper boundaries satisfy that
(2) Proof: The second mathematical induction is utilized to prove the correctness of Theorem 1. 
Inductive step: Let us assume that (1) holds for any integer
Then for t = k + 1, according to Line 4, Algorithm 1 and the definition of lower boundary, L[k + 1] can be written as
where the left part can be deduced as
And for any integer i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), the right part can be deduced as
Since R and H are non-decreasing sequences, we have
Then it is true that
Thus,
By mathematical induction, (1) always holds for any integer t(0 ≤ t ≤ K ). Besides, the definition of upper boundary could easily lead us to (2) . So Theorem 1 is proven.
At this point, the average time complexity of the simplified version of the boundary generation sub-algorithm has dropped to O(K ), whereas the encryption sub-algorithm and the decryption sub-algorithm remain the same. The only true expense is that the secret keys are strictly in a non-decreasing order.
3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES
The encryption function E : X → Y of AOPE meets the following properties. A theorem about the order-preservation of this algorithm is firstly established.
Theorem 2 (Order-Preservation): For any integer t (t
= 0, 1, · · · , K − 1
), the encryption function satisfies that E(t) < E(t + 1).
Proof: In light of Line 5, Algorithm 1, if R t is a nonnegative integer, then we have
. And since the boundary sets (L and U) are monotonic, that is,
where the second step is due to Line 4, Algorithm 1.
Let us consider Algorithm 2, a conclusion follows that
Notice that
then it is true that
So Theorem 2 follows, and vice versa. The encryption function of AOPE is monotonic, that is,
and only if E(a) < E(b).
Next, we attempt to show additive order-preservations of this algorithm. For any plaintext value v ∈ X and any set of non-negative integers ς ⊆ X whose size is |ς | ≥ 2, we denote the arithmetic sum of all the elements in this set by SUM(ς), and we denote the corresponding cipher-
) is defined to accumulate the upper boundaries (resp. lower boundaries) of the ciphertext partitions of the elements in the set ς . Here, it is presumed
, and the simplified version of AOPE is used to perform encryption and decryption operations.
Theorem 3 (Additive Order-Preservation I): For any integers SUM(ς) ≤ v, the encryption function satisfies that
Proof: Firstly, the following property holds:
where the second step is due to Line 4, Algorithm 1, i.e.,
And since
Theorem 3 follows. The first additive order-preservation of AOPE is proven.
Theorem 4 (Additive Order-Preservation II): For any integers SUM(ς) > v, the encryption function satisfies that
Proof: Firstly, in light of the linear boundary function of the simplified algorithm, the following equality holds:
Since both R and H are non-decreasing sequences in the simplified algorithm, we have max 0≤i≤K {R i } = R K and min 0≤i≤K {R i } = R 0 as well as max 0≤i≤K {H i } = H K and min 0≤i≤K {H i } = H 0 . It is further noticed that
Therefore, we have
Then after substituting the precondition SUM(ς ) − v ≥ 1 into the above equality, the expression SUM(
. Theorem 4 is completed. The second additive orderpreservation of AOPE is proven.
To sum up, for any value ∈ X , if there is SUM(ς) = value, then SUM(ς ) ≤ value and SUM(ς) > value − 1 hold. From Theorem 3, we know that
And from Theorem 4, we know that
Hence, the accumulated result of ciphertext values will only be mapped into a unique ciphertext partition, then we can obtain that
The possible noise growth phenomenon caused by the probabilistic encryption method in our original algorithms [27] is overcome by AOPE, thereby there exists a significant decrease in the computation and storage of the boundaries of ciphertext partitions. The above conclusions will be used to solve the problem on the secure outsourcing computing of sequence comparison. For more details about the mapping structure, algorithm description, and cryptographic properties, please refer to our previous work [27] .
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) HASH SECURITY
The salted hash algorithm is a non-invertible secure mapping method. The same character is mapped into some uncorrelated hash values using random salt values with the probability 1 − 1/|Q|. It is impossible for an attacker to infer either the full content of character sequences or the equality relationship among characters, simply relying on hashed results.
Furthermore, the introduction of the set Q in this paper further improves the ability of the hash algorithms to resist attacks and reduces the difficulties in the late-stage development. Through the analysis, we can see that, on the one hand, the hash scope of characters is continually extended with the increase of the scale factor α. The attack difficulty for attackers increases, and the security risk of the serious leakage of string-typed data caused by statistical attacks decreases. Nevertheless, at the same time, this kind of cipher tool is becoming quite hard to develop. The computational and storage overhead also grows with it when the character sequences and indexes of cost matrices are hashed by the end user. On the other hand, in order to reduce the complexity of the client-side deployment, we usually set α < 1, then the hashing of the whole sequence will share a unified set of random salt values, rather than assign a private salt value for each character separately.
2) AOPE SECURITY
Regarding the security of AOPE, since the undiscovered initial partition location σ , partition length R, partition offset H, and partition boundary sets (L and U) are all local private, the attacker has much trouble inferring the distribution of the ciphertext domain in polynomial time, just based on limited plaintext-ciphertext pairs without any prior knowledge about the whole plaintext domain. In general, the time complexity of common attacks is related to the length of secret keys. The secrecy of outsourced data is thus guaranteed. Similar to another work [27] , this algorithm can resist the ciphertextonly attack, statistical attack as well as weak chosen-plaintext attack, which is briefly demonstrated as follows:
First of all, according to the partition interval inequation
adversary A launches a ciphertext-only attack, the probability that the plaintext m and its secret key R m are successfully broken is at most
.
Along with the increase of security parameters, namely the system keys (σ, H 0 , R 0 , R m−1 , and R m+1 ), the probability P[success A,R,H,σ ] tends to be negligible. Secondly, different distributions of the plaintext domain are approximately converted by the one-to-many probabilistic mapping into a ciphertext domain whose distribution is uniform, so that all kinds of known statistical attacks can be prevented successfully, that is,
In what follows, for the case of chosen-plaintext attacks, the achievable optimal security is that the attacker cannot have any additional sensitive information except the ciphertext order-relations and multiple-relations. We further make assumptions about the attack approaches to define a notion called INDistinguishability under Additive Ordered Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-AOCPA [27] for short), and an IND-AOCPA security game [27] is modelled between the end user and a PPT adversary A. As we could see, the adversary wins the game with the highest probability
where the negl(R, H, σ ) is a negligible probability. In other words, any polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage to win the above-mentioned security game, which indicates that this algorithm is IND-AOCPA-secure. Now we can claim that the cryptographic properties make AOPE suitable for addition and comparison on encrypted data, whereas they also inherently limit its achievable security. As a cipher tool in secure outsourcing schemes, AOPE effectively settles the balance between practicality and security. Please see our previous work [27] for more details about the security analyses or formalized proofs of this cryptographic construction.
The AOPE algorithm will be used for E-SC in the next section to encrypt cost matrix elements. Under most practical regimes, the cost matrices selected by sequence comparison have a limited range of elements. They are at most quadratic in the alphabet size and are relatively concentrated into a few values. Though the probabilistic nature of AOPE would prevent revealing the correspondence of inputting plaintexts to outputting ciphertexts, there seems to be leakage of substantial order information. Specifically speaking, the security implication of AOPE presumes that the attacker knows nothing about the distribution of the plaintext domain, e.g., how to set the maximum plaintext value K , how many different elements in cost matrices, etc. Taking two ciphertext values c 1 = E(m 1 ) and c 2 = E(m 2 ) as an example, the attacker only learns from the intrinsic nature of AOPE that m 1 ≤ m 2 if c 1 < c 2 , but neither two plaintext values (m 1 and m 2 ) nor the difference between them. When encryption keys are small, they may differ greatly from each other, and their ciphertexts meet that xc 1 < c 2 (x ∈ N + ). When encryption keys are big, they may differ slightly from each other, and even sometimes, cases like m 1 = m 2 might appear. The numerical relations of AOPE are hardly beneficial in breaking the encrypted cost matrices.
IV. SECURE SEQUENCE COMPARISON OUTSOURCING VIA SINGLE SERVER
A generalized approach for E-SC to perform sequence comparison between outsourced encrypted string-typed data is discussed in detail in this section.
Above all, an overview study on the overall architecture, as well as the data flow of the E-SC, are summarized. And afterwards, a variety of core functional modules are designed, aiming to solve the issues on the padding of sequence length, the partition of the random salt set and the expansion of cost matrices. At last, the specific processing steps of the E-SC secure outsourcing scheme are introduced stage by stage, including the client-side pre-processing stage, the server-side sequence comparison stage as well as the clientside post-processing stage.
A. OVERALL ARCHITECTURE
The secure outsourcing in our E-SC system works by executing sequence comparison operation directly over encrypted string-typed data. Since only a single cloud server is required to participate in the construction of the matrix M, the interactions with end users or other cloud servers are completely avoided, thereby acquiring the security ability to resist the collusion attacks at the server side.
The overall architecture of E-SC is based on the system model stated in Section II-B, consisting of a double layer, as shown in Fig. 2 . Rectangular and rounded boxes represent processes and data respectively. Shading indicates components added by E-SC. Arrows indicate the data transmission and the call relation in the process of outsourcing. Dashed lines are used to separate the scope of the end user and the CSP. This architecture is the first attempt to develop secure sequence comparison outsourcing under a singleserver model, which could be popular in similar studies.
Next, the generalized E-SC data flow in the outsourcing computing process of sequence comparison is described in detail. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the procedure of collusionresistant secure outsourcing for character sequence comparison is offered as follows.
1) The end user hides the length of character sequences by the padding module in advance. Meanwhile, the alphabet and the cost matrices of edit operations are supplemented, as well.
2) The end user generates a set of random salt values and properly keeps them. According to some distribution pattern of the characters in the alphabet, the set is split into multiple subsets by the partition module.
3) The end user hashes the padded character sequences using the salted hash algorithm and partitioned subsets of random salt values, and submits them to the CSP. After that, any ciphertext copy of the outsourced character sequences is no longer preserved. VOLUME 6, 2018
4) The end user generates a random permutation of the alphabet, then expands the cost matrix indexes of various edit operations by the expansion module. These indexes are also hashed using the salted hash algorithm. 5) The end user generates secret encryption or decryption keys and properly keeps them. The expanded cost matrix elements are sent to the CSP after being encrypted by the AOPE algorithm. 6) The CSP receives and stores the encrypted character sequences and the encrypted cost matrices, executes encrypted sequence comparison on a single cloud server, and returns the encrypted edit distance and redundant edit path. 7) The end user receives the encrypted results of sequence comparison. The final edit distance and edit path are recovered by the decryption module and the filter module respectively. Steps 1 to 5 in the above procedure are the client-side preprocessing stage, Step 6 is the server-side sequence comparison stage, and Step 7 is the client-side post-processing stage. The design principles and detailed implementation methods of the core functional modules in each stage will be deeply explored below.
B. MODULE DESIGN
Generally speaking, compared with the universal model of public cloud outsourcing, no additional network communication is incurred between the client side and the single cloud server in collusion-resistant secure outsourcing scheme of sequence comparison algorithms. The end user is responsible for hiding the original string-typed data and cost values from the semi-trusted CSP and preserving the maneuverability of encrypted sequences. In order to achieve these goals, E-SC is required to deploy the following three functional modules at the local side:
Padding Module: In some cases, although the length of the character sequences is also sensitive information, it still cannot be hidden by hashing operation. Under the premise that the computation result of the edit distance is not changed, the padding module appends the special character $ to the end of the character sequence ρ. The padded length is randomly selected from the interval [0, n], where n is the number of the characters in the original sequence. Next, we have the padded character sequence ρ , whose length has already been obfuscated.
At the same time, $ is supplemented into the alphabet (e.g., = {A, C, G, T , $} in genomic sequences), and the relevant operational costs about the character $ are specified as
Partition Module: Essentially, the traditional hash algorithm is just a simple substitution cipher. Although the introduction of the set of random salt values greatly increases the difficulty for attackers to perform cryptanalysis according to the frequency distribution of hash values, they can still acquire enough data in the ciphertext domain for tens of thousands of character sequences to predict the mapping relations among characters if the scale factor α 1. The partition module is utilized to solve the problem that the frequency number of each character is inconsistent in a sequence, so that the salted hash algorithm can successfully defend against this kind of statistical attack. Its implementation effect is equivalent to a poly-alphabetic substitution cipher.
The design principle of the partition module is recorded as follows.
We count the total length of the character sequences to be outsourced and the occurrence frequency of each character. That is, the frequency of the character ε in the alphabet is denoted as n ε (ε ∈ ). Then the pre-selected random salt set Q is split into multiple non-exclusive subsets, which are represented as Q ε (ε ∈ ) respectively, and the size of each subset satisfies the following proportional expression:
When we hash a character ε (ε ∈ ) in the sequences and the cost matrix indexes by the salted hash algorithm, the parameter salt will be randomly selected from the partitioned subset of salt values (i.e., Q ε ). For the sake of ensuring the uniqueness of hashed results, disjoint hash value sets can be produced by appropriately adjusting the salt value, so we have
Here, in view of the collision-resistance of hash algorithms, the above condition is computationally feasible.
At this point, we can point out that the occurrence rate of different encrypted characters is roughly equal regardless of the value α. The frequency of their hash values is approximate to a uniform distribution, along with the value set W that is defined as
In practical outsourcing applications, the end user could also create locally a hash mapping table to accelerate the data access in the transformation process of secret information with the help of linear data structure. To some extent, the privacy preservation of outsourced string-typed data is accomplished through the data hashing technique based on salted hash algorithms, which further preserves the efficient data searchability when searching cost matrices.
Expansion Module: The cost matrix indexes of edit operations are usually composed of a random permutation of the alphabet. Nevertheless, since the random salt values expand the hash scope of the characters, the encrypted cost matrices must be expanded, so as to facilitate their direct retrieval from the CSP in the process of executing encrypted sequence comparison.
Taking the cost matrix index ε (ε ∈ ) in the plaintext domain as an example, the expansion module will expand it to |Q ε | dummy index values with identical characters (|Q ε | is specially rounded up to an integer here, so that |Q ε | ≥ 1 always holds). Then it is easy to get the expanded cost matrix of insertion operation, i.e.,
the expanded cost matrix of deletion operation, i.e.,
and the expanded cost matrix of substitution operation, i.e.,
Afterwards, all elements of the set W will be regarded as the corresponding indexes of cost matrices in the ciphertext domain after being hashed by salted hash algorithms. For the encrypted cost matrix of insertion operation (i.e., EI), its element value is that
For the encrypted cost matrix of deletion operation (i.e., ED), its element value is that
And for the encrypted cost matrix of substitution operation (i.e., ES), its element value is that
At the end of the expansion module, a random permutation is generated again in ordered rows and columns. The obfuscation of cost matrix indexes has already achieved the effect of information hiding by this time.
C. PRE-PROCESSING STAGE
As noted in Section III-A and Section III-B, the salted hash algorithm as well as the cipher tool with simultaneous orderpreservation and additivity (i.e., AOPE) will be used to build the solution for encrypted sequence comparison. The primary work at the client side in the stage of pre-processing is to determine the system secret keys, random salt values, and other relevant parameters. The detailed information about the setting mode is shown as follows:
Parameter Setting for Character Sequence: Firstly, the end user constructs and initializes the cost matrices of edit operations (i.e., I, D and S). In this paper, we assume that the cost values of edit operations among various characters are all non-negative integers:
In the second place, the original character sequences (λ and µ) are padded by the padding module. Then a padded sequence λ of length n 1 and a padded sequence µ of length n 2 are developed, respectively. In what follows, the private random salt set Q is selected by the end user according to the length of the character sequences and the scale factor α.
Parameter Setting for Sequence Comparison: As we can see from the sequence comparison algorithm in Section II-A, the worst case when we transform the character sequence λ into µ is first deleting the characters in the sequence λ and then inserting the characters in the sequence µ one by one. Consequently, the maximum length of the edit path is n 1 +n 2 , while its corresponding edit distance could be up to MAX · (n 1 + n 2 ). Among them, MAX = max{I, D, S} is defined as the maximum element value in the three cost matrices of edit operations.
Parameter Setting for Cipher Tool: In the dynamic programming process of the matrix M, we store the cost values of edit operations on the edit path with a set ς. In contrast to the preconditions of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the size of the set meets that 2 ≤ |ς| ≤ n 1 + n 2 , and the arithmetic sum of all elements in the set meets that v ≤ MAX · (n 1 + n 2 ), so if the secret key σ conforms to the following inequation:
certainly holds. Therefore, the additive orderpreservation of AOPE always exists, which can judge out the exact order of arithmetic sum after several encrypted costs are added together. Besides, the parameter mode of the maximum plaintext value K in AOPE is set as K = (MAX + 1) · (n 1 + n 2 ) ≥ MAX · (n 1 + n 2 ) + |ς |. The end user randomly selects the system keys R and H, and generates private boundary sets to divide the ciphertext space.
The subsequent work of the end user in the pre-processing stage is focused on two aspects: data encryption and data outsourcing, whose implementation methods are expressed as follows.
1) The random salt set Q is split into multiple partitioned subsets of salt values by the partition module, i.e., Q ε (ε ∈ ). 2) The padded character sequences λ and µ are hashed by the hash module to h(λ ) and h(µ ) respectively, where the hash rule of a single character is recorded as
3) The encrypted character sequences h(λ ) and h(µ ) are outsourced to the CSP. 4) The original cost matrices of edit operations (i.e., I, D and S) are expanded respectively to I , D and S by the expansion module and the alphabet . Also, a random permutation of rows and columns is performed. 5) The expanded cost matrix indexes are hashed by the hash module, e.g., the index value ε (ε ∈ ) is hashed to w = h(ε, salt), salt ∈ Q ε . 6) The expanded cost matrix elements are encrypted by AOPE. The encryption rule of the encryption module is used to restrict the encrypted cost value of inserting the character ε, i.e.,
the encrypted cost value of deleting the character ε, i.e.,
ED[w] = E(D[ε]), w = h(ε, salt),
and the encrypted cost value of substituting the character a with b (a, b ∈ ), i.e.,
ES[w a , w b ] = E(S[a, b]) + E(0),
7) The encrypted cost matrices of edit operations (i.e., EI, ED and ES) are outsourced to the CSP.
D. SEQUENCE COMPARISON STAGE
The sequence comparison operation at the server side is the non-interactive stage in the overall outsourcing flow of E-SC. A single server successfully works to defend against the collusion attacks widely spread in existing schemes. After receiving two encrypted sequences h(λ ) and h(µ ) as well as three encrypted cost matrices EI, ED and ES, the CSP will execute the following computations directly over an encrypted matrix EM, where λ h j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 1 ) is the jth encrypted character in the encrypted sequence h(λ ) and
is the ith encrypted character in the encrypted sequence h(µ ).
Elements in the matrix EM are encrypted by AOPE, so the essential problem in the dynamic programming process is the numerical comparison operation of the encrypted sum. According to the additive order-preservation property in Section III-B3, the solution can be developed by constructing equal-length sequences of edit operations.
From Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we know that for sets of non-negative integers (i.e., ς 1 and ς 2 ), if we suppose that the arithmetic sum of all set elements in both sides satisfies that SUM(ς 1 ) = value 1 and SUM(ς 2 ) = value 2 , then we have
At this time, if we take the encrypted sum SUM(E(ς 1 )) and SUM(E(ς 2 )) to exactly judge the order relation between value 1 and value 2 , then it is necessary to require that |ς 1 | = |ς 2 |. Hence, in our encrypted sequence comparison scheme, every possible sequence of edit operations should be equal in length, so that the corresponding encrypted costs still support comparisons after being added together. 
We next denote a state in the sequence comparison operation as EM
Inductive step: Let us assume that (5) holds for any integer
Then for i = k 1 + 1 and j = k 2 , there is an insertion operation in the transformation from the state
can be written as
For i = k 1 and j = k 2 + 1, there is a deletion operation in the transformation from the state
Also, for i = k 1 + 1 and j = k 2 + 1, there is a substitution operation in the transformation from the state EM [k 1 
The main reason is that the encrypted cost value of substitution operation is constituted by the summation of two independent encrypted parts, whose details can be seen in (3). To avoid unnecessarily cluttering the exposition, we simply treat it here as two edit operations.
The above-mentioned results indicate that if
Moreover, by mathematical induction, (5) always holds for any integer i, j (0 ≤ i ≤ n 2 , 0 ≤ j ≤ n 1 ). Therefore, Theorem 5 is proven.
The sequence length of the edit operations in the matrix EM is fixed under the same state. In other words, as for the three state transition equations in (4), the encrypted sum can be directly compared in the ciphertext domain after several ciphertexts are added together because of the same number of summation. Thus,
At the end of the sequence comparison stage, the encrypted edit distance EM [n 2 , n 1 ] and the redundant set of edit path are returned to the end user by the CSP.
E. POST-PROCESSING STAGE
After receiving the encrypted results of the sequence comparison, the end user will enter into the client-side postprocessing stage, which mainly targets two tasks:
1) The final computation result of edit distance is deduced using the decryption module and the linear boundary function of AOPE, that is,
2) The edit operations with zero cost and special character $ in the set of edit path are eliminated using the filter module to acquire the final edit path. Through observations and analyses, we can guarantee that these ciphertext computations in the sequence comparison stage will not affect the correctness of similarity results, and we claim a new theorem as follows:
Theorem 6 (E-SC Correctness): E-SC outputs the correct edit distance and edit path in its post-processing stage.
Proof: For one thing, combining a series of properties given by Theorem 3 to Theorem 5 could lead us to that
It is clear that the above relation still holds true for the terminal state (i = n 2 and j = n 1 ) in the transition equation (4) . Additionally, cost values of the operation sequences have not been changed by random padding from the character $, so M [n 2 , n 1 ] is accurate as an edit distance.
For another, the encryption method utilized by E-SC fully preserves the index structure of cost matrices and the matrix M, so specific operation sequences can be directly traced to plan out an edit path. Theorem 6 is thus proven.
In summary, a privacy-preserving sequence comparison method is provided for outsourced encrypted sequences by E-SC. The computation on the cloud is performed without data decryption, and it resists the attacks from the cloud servers, while simultaneously achieving efficient computing and procedural security.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
E-SC, whose overall execution effects are comprehensively influenced by various factors, can be directly deployed on a universal model of public cloud outsourcing. The simulation experiments in this section will emphasize on the performance evaluation of the client-side overhead and the serverside working efficiency in E-SC to fully validate the secrecy and usability of encrypted string-typed data.
The simulation experimental environment was composed of machines with 2.39GHz Intel Core i5-4210U processor, 8GB memory and Windows 8 operating system to run both the cloud server and the client sides. E-SC was developed in the Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 Ultimate with C++11 standard. Long integer calculation and cryptographic algorithms were implemented respectively using the static library NTL 9.7.0 2 and OpenSSL 1.0.1s. 3 Various functional modules, which consist of approximately 700 lines of source codes in total, mainly ran on the end users. The CSP requires only approximately 60 lines of source codes in total to execute encrypted sequence comparison operations.
The test data comes from some randomly assigned genomic sequences. Let us set the length of the two genomic sequences to n 1 = n 2 . All cost values of insertion, deletion, and substitution operations were randomly taken from the interval [0, MAX). Furthermore, we assume that MAX = 5 in the simulation programming and hold particular promise to replace +∞ with a ciphertext value E(K ). The genomic sequences and cost matrices were selected in advance, and AOPE chose 2K + 3 random numbers (8 bits per integer) as encryption keys, whose total length reaches 8(2K + 3) bits and is expected to provide adequate security for the bigger K value (see Section IV-C for other parameters). The following experimental data in the rest of this section is measured by taking the average value over at least ten iterations.
The experimental environment was built based on the overall architecture in Section IV-A. Our experimental scheme strictly follows the generalized procedure of secure outsourcing service. The end user does not store any ciphertext copy of the character sequences after outsourcing them, while the CSP takes charge of managing the encrypted strings and executing sequence comparison. Other works in the stage of pre-processing and post-processing are completed by the end user. Next, some related experimental results are conducted to verify the performance.
We set α = 0.1 and measured the variation tendency of the average running time at the client side and at the cloud server side under different character sequence lengths (Fig. 3) . As illustrated in this figure, the time spent by end users on the pre-processing and post-processing stage, as well as the time spent by the CSP on the sequence comparison stage, are recorded successively. Among them, the configuration time for relevant parameters (e.g., secret keys, salt values or boundaries) is not included. Such a computational overhead can be handled with the help of a private cloud. For related evaluation results of the efficiency of AOPE, please refer to our previous work [27] .
The pre-processing stage is classified into two categories according to whether cost matrices are constructed in advance, namely the pre-processing with fixed encrypted cost matrices and the pre-processing with mutable encrypted cost matrices. The former uses fixed cost values and selects a random salt set Q based on the maximum possible length of character sequences. Three encrypted cost matrices can be reused after a one-time announcement to save the pre-treatment time significantly. The latter is an extreme case. Every time the outsourcing happens, new cost matrices are generated. The excessive time overhead is used to encrypt them.
With the continuous increase of the length of the character sequences (i.e., n 1 = n 2 ), the average running time of end users grows linearly in the stage of pre-processing with fixed costs, and presents a tendency of quadratic growth in the stage of pre-processing with mutable costs, as shown in the above Fig. 3(a) .
Further analyses indicate that the average time complexity of pre-processing can be noted as O(n 1 + n 2 ) + O(|W | 2 ), where the computational complexity of the padding, partition, and expansion module is O(n 1 + n 2 ), O(|W |), and O(|W |) respectively. The random permutation is also completed with O(|W |) computational complexity after expansion. The hashing efficiency of the character sequences and cost matrix indexes is related with the specific hash algorithm (take MD5 for example in simulation experiments) adopted by the hash module, whereas the encryption efficiency of the cost matrix elements is related with the AOPE algorithm (see Section III-B2 for details) adopted by the encryption module. The communication complexity to outsource the encrypted character sequences and the encrypted cost matrices is O(n 1 +n 2 ) and O(|W | 2 ) respectively. Beyond that, there is no additional communication overhead in the overall secure outsourcing process of E-SC.
Compared with the time used in the pre-treatment, the average running time of the end user in the post-processing stage is approximately close to a linear growth and is stable within 0.07ms, which can be ignored. The computational complexities of the decryption and the filter module are O(log K ) and O(n 1 +n 2 ), respectively. The end user can obtain the correct edit distance and edit path after the results of encrypted sequence comparison are operated by decryption and filtration. Fig. 3(b) simulates the average running time of the CSP in the stage of sequence comparison, whose curve basically conforms to the rule of the quadratic growth. This figure compares the computational overhead of the CSP to perform sequence comparison between the plaintext domain and the ciphertext domain. Their average time complexities are denoted as O(n 1 n 2 ) and O(n 1 n 2 ), respectively. We know from these comparison results that the execution performance of an encrypted sequence comparison is generally worse than that of a plaintext sequence comparison. Fixing this issue is dependent on a targeted adjustment for the number of cloud resources and the methods of cloud configuration, which is outside of the evaluation scope of our paper. Besides, regarding the storage overhead in E-SC, its storage complexities of the encrypted character sequences and the encrypted cost matrices at the cloud server side are O(n 1 + n 2 ) and O(|W | 2 ) respectively. In addition to the decryption keys and sequence lengths that must be stored, there is no need for the client side to take up any additional storage space.
In what follows, we will provide some theoretical foundations for the comprehensive trade-off between security and execution performance of E-SC through experimental data. We have n 1 = n 2 = 500 in this simulation experiment. Fig. 4 is a statistical summary of the overall time overhead in E-SC under different scale factor α, including two parts: the processing time spent by end users and the CSP. Only the extreme case of mutable cost matrices is considered here.
In general, with the continuous growth of the scale factor α, although the average running time of the CSP increases slightly, its changing scope is still limited. In contrast, the average running time of end users always remains steady at quadratic growth. Especially when α > 0.5 in the current simulation environment, the time overhead of the end user in the pre-processing stage has gradually exceeded that of the CSP in the sequence comparison stage. As with mutable encrypted cost matrices, outsourcing is no better than simply running the sequence comparison algorithm locally. As with fixed encrypted cost matrices, the client-side overhead in this outsourcing process is negligible (the middle curve in Fig. 3(a) ).
The main reason is that the value α directly decides the size of the set of random salt values, i.e., the set Q with |Q| = α · max{n 1 , n 2 }, and then indirectly controls the size of the set of hash values, i.e., the set W with |W | = |Q|. The major performance overhead in the pre-processing stage comes from the construction of the encrypted cost matrices, whose computational complexity O(|W | 2 ) has already been explained above. As a consequence, there is no doubt that the storage security of outsourced data would be improved with the increase of the value α (e.g., every encrypted character in the encrypted sequence is different from each other when α = 1, so we can make the infeasibility of statistical attacks completely), but the amount of local computation would be great for the end user. In other words, if E-SC takes |Q| 2 or |W | 2 as a metric to measure security, then its security is in an inverse proportion relationship to the execution performance. At present, any performance optimization about this scheme will be bound to the degradation on part of security.
In fact, towards some practical scenarios of outsourcing application, since the encrypted cost matrices constructed by the end user at the pre-processing stage can be reused after the value |Q| is fixed, the client-side overhead in E-SC is still in the acceptable range. Meanwhile, in view of the particular collusion-resistant property of E-SC, it is quite hard for us to compare its overall performance with other existing popular schemes through intuitive simulation experiments. A more comprehensive comparison will appear in the near future.
VI. DISCUSSION
This section first gives a walk-through instance for E-SC to illustrate the secure outsourcing computing of sequence comparison, which contributes to readers' understanding of the overall architecture. Then it places more emphasis on the system security under specific threat models. We also summarize related works and analyse their limitations. In the end, we point out the main research direction for future work.
A. SCHEME INSTANTIATION
We instantiate the strings as genomic sequences in the subsection. Assuming that the length of the genomic sequences is n 1 = n 2 = 2 and MAX = 3. The end user requests to outsource the following two plaintext sequences:
Plaintext genomic sequence 1: TC.
Plaintext genomic sequence 2: AC.
Three cost matrices of edit operations are built as follows:
The end user invokes the padding module (the random padded lengths of the two sequences are 0 and 2 respectively) to output the padded plaintext sequences below:
Padded plaintext genomic sequence 1: TC.
Padded plaintext genomic sequence 2: AC$$.
Subsequently, the end user invokes the partition module and the expansion module to output the expanded cost matrices, as shown below:
Without loss of generality, we set |Q| = 4 here. The ratio of the size of every partitioned subset of random salt values is thus |Q T | : |Q A | : |Q C | : |Q $ | = 1 : 1 : 2 : 2. In addition, the base character G is not involved in the current round of sequence comparison, which is omitted in the paper. Next, the end user invokes the hash module and the encryption module to output and outsource the two encrypted sequences below (the adjacent encrypted base characters are separated by a blank space):
Encrypted genomic sequence 1: 0D32 3707.
Encrypted genomic sequence 2: E72B 8E4F 44B0 F848. VOLUME 6, 2018 And the three encrypted cost matrices of edit operations are 
The CSP executes sequence comparison algorithms, and the specific computation method of the encrypted edit distance EM [4, 2] is given below:
= 27832. After receiving the encrypted computation results, the end user invokes the decryption module and the filter module to get the plaintext edit distance D(27832) − (2 + 4) + 2 = 1 as well as the ordered set of edit path {S, I , D}. The procedure of E-SC secure outsourcing is finished.
B. SYSTEM SECURITY
The ability of the salted hash and AOPE algorithm to defend against various security attacks has been fully analysed in Section III-C. Next, we are going to focus on the security of E-SC system in many aspects under specific threat model.
According to the threat model in the above Section II-B, a semi-trusted CSP or third-party malicious intruders enhance their access rights by exploiting server software vulnerabilities in cloud computing platforms. These attackers attempt to passively access the confidential data stored by end users to the CSP. E-SC aims to resist this threat and provides the following security guarantees:
1) The end user utilizes salted hash and AOPE to encrypt all sensitive character sequences and cost matrices. System keys and initial parameters are stored at the local side and isolated from the cloud, so the attacker has difficulty in compromising any encrypted data that has been outsourced to the cloud by ciphertext-only attacks. Since the outsourcing process is done on a single cloud server, it is impossible to launch a collusion attack, which has achieved the design objectives of secrecy and usability in this paper.
Some strict access control policies (e.g., [28] ) are specified by E-SC architecture. String-typed data coming from different sources are encrypted with different keys to minimize the correlation leakage caused by key sharing among end users. Under the application scenarios with multi-user, the individual loss brought by intercepting private information will still be under control. At any time, the end user who logs into the system by a valid password can only access the authorized outsourced encrypted sequences, and these corresponding sequences can only be correctly encrypted and decrypted by a unique system key. Considering that attackers do not have the adaptive ability to encrypt or decrypt without knowing secret keys, they cannot launch any known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, or active attack.
The CSP works to perform dynamic programming-based encrypted sequence comparison algorithms, where ciphertext values should support operations in searching, addition, and comparison. The salted hash algorithm permits direct retrieval of the encrypted cost matrices over the cloud. Furthermore, since the deviation of the equality comparison in probabilistic encryption algorithms [27] has been overcome by the AOPE algorithm, there is no need to disclose any relevant information about private boundaries or intervals of ciphertext partitions to cloud servers. The arithmetic sum can be directly compared after several ciphertexts are added together, and accurate results can be acquired entirely from outsourcing computing, in order to avoid the introduction of more uncontrollable security risks.
2) The random salt values of the salted hash algorithm obviously reduce the success probability that the attacker guesses the plaintext character based on the distribution of basic characters. The partition module takes the frequency of characters as the partition ratio of the salt set, which makes the encrypted characters approximate to a uniform distribution. The probability of privacy disclosure decreases at the same position and the uncertainty of hash values increases in output. That is, the average entropy of the salted hash algorithm is improved.
However, on the condition that the value α is small, then as long as the attacker has encrypted character sequences with enough length, the special association relationship of encrypted characters might be found to launch a targeted attack. By combining the order relations or multiple relations in encrypted cost matrices, a certain number of plaintextciphertext pairs are built, and the final edit distance might be broken. As for the case with a large value α, the above attack strategies only provide little help. It can be seen that the global security of E-SC is directly influenced by the scale factor α.
Consider the following: the AOPE construction specifies that ciphertext partitions are non-overlapping, which means that a rough partition interval might be gradually inferred by employing the ideas of clustering after the cloud attacker receives these ciphertexts. In practice, however, the accuracy of typical automatic clustering techniques is usually limited before the total number of categories is settled. It is easy to cause some false positives and false negatives. The ciphertexts of different plaintexts may be divided into a single group, whereas the ciphertexts of the same plaintext may be divided into two groups. This shows that the AOPE ciphertext is insufficient to recover the whole information about the same character in outsourced sequences without any prior knowledge about the distribution of cost values. The AOPE algorithm is reasonable in the secure outsourcing of sequence comparisons.
3) E-SC does not protect the privacy of the edit path. Even so, since the basic characters and the cost values are hidden fundamentally by the cipher tool, the knowledge collected by the CSP is limited. It is merely confined to the encrypted edit distance, the redundant length of edit path and the operation sequence to be traced, but the critical content that is helpful to analyse the original string-typed data (e.g., cost matrix indexes or specific characters, etc.) is not included. Hence, this kind of outsourcing method truly achieves the confidentiality of the intermediate procedure using some computable cryptographic techniques.
Compared with the multi-server model, the information leakage takes place more or less in the proposed system. For the security of public cloud environment, however, this is another beneficial complementary choice. When there is a contract violation about the non-collusion requirements between two cloud servers, the end user simply cannot detect or ask someone to claim responsibility for certain malicious behaviours under the current outsourcing architecture. The collusion attack always has the covert attack methods and a serious threat level, and thus it should be defended before outsourcing. In conclusion, our E-SC is a more practical, secure outsourcing system that provides the basic security on the premise of supporting collusion-resistant comparison over encrypted sequences.
C. RELATED WORK
The computation of sequence comparison or edit distance is one of the basic contents of string similarity measurement and genomic sequence analysis. Since the first solution was presented by Wagner and Fischer [22] , the issues about the security and privacy of outsourced string-typed data were identified as a vital research direction in the public cloud environment. At present, although a great number of private computation methods of sequence comparison outsourcing have been introduced, it is hard to effectively balance the secrecy and utility of sensitive information. From the perspective of the cipher tool on which these methods rely, the existing studies about the secure outsourcing of sequence comparison algorithms can be broadly classified into three categories, which are shown as follows:
Homomorphic Encryption: Researchers usually employ homomorphic encryption techniques to meet the common needs of various queries or operations on the outsourced encrypted sequences. As a compromise to fully homomorphic encryption, representative outsourcing schemes of Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) include the genomic data mining [4] and disease susceptibility tests [5] using Paillier cryptosystem, and the substring matching [6] using ElGamal cryptosystem, etc. However, as for the comparative analysis of encrypted character sequences, the similarity metrics supported by the currently known PHEs remain limited.
With a comprehensive consideration between efficiency and functionality, more practical secure outsourcing methods [7] , [8] for the multiple Hamming distance and approximate edit distance were described by researchers through efficient Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). In contrast, the SHE scheme [9] of standard Wagner-Fischer edit distance [22] has been developed recently. The ciphertext computation is still time-consuming even on short character sequences. In the simulation experiment [9] , it took about 27.5 seconds to compare two 8-length encrypted character sequences.
The secure outsourcing schemes of sequence comparison based on homomorphic encryption are generally flexible, and their protocols are usually implemented with low interaction and communication complexity. Nevertheless, the computational overhead on the cloud is extremely large, which fails to achieve a real practicality. The efficiency of outsourcing computing will be promoted directly by any performance optimization about homomorphic techniques in the future.
Garbled Circuit: Two non-colluding servers are adopted to take charge of the construction and evaluation of garbled circuits respectively, thereby realizing a secure two-party computation. The privacy-preserving protocols designed by Jha et al. [10] to compute edit distance and Smith-Waterman similarity score [29] were improved by Huang et al. [11] soon afterwards. Research works show that many interactive operations are still required by the oblivious transfers in the evaluation of garbled circuits. This part of workload can be safely outsourced to a third-party public cloud [12] .
The paper [13] proposed the first secure non-interactive outsourcing solution for sequence comparison, which completely avoids the use of homomorphic or public-key cryptography. The edit distance is solved by delegating specific computing tasks to two cloud servers. Its overall computational complexity and round complexity are reduced on the premise that no storage space is added. In the verification studies [14] , [15] of the outsourcing computing for sequence comparison, garbled circuits are integrated with homomorphic encryption techniques by users to judge whether the servers honestly execute the pre-agreed protocol or not.
The secure outsourcing schemes of sequence comparison based on a garbled circuit are tractable in the public cloud environment, but the secure two-party computation protocols formed from them cause a sharp increase in the amount of interactive computation. In addition, since the over-reliance on the cloud non-colluding assumption cannot be hedged, the performance and security level of outsourcing computing achieved in realistic applications is also limited.
Oblivious Transfer: Atallah et al. [18] first presented the concept of private computation of sequence comparison algorithms in 2003. It is committed to providing a secure interactive computing approach for weighted edit distance under the application scenarios with multi-datasource. Expensive computational and communication overhead is inevitably caused by the oblivious transfer protocols. It has been later confirmed that the excessive workload at the local side can be transferred to several untrusted third-party proxy servers [19] . Afterwards, secure outsourcing protocols of sequence comparison developed from further studies [16] , [17] are more suitable for the situation where a single-datasource is outsourced to multiple cloud servers.
The subsequent work [20] was gradually extended to the distributed secure multi-party computations of the SmithWaterman algorithm. The request for outsourcing computing is decomposed into several sub-problems, each of which is passed out to different participants in the protocol and is processed cooperatively. In 2010, Blanton and Aliasgari outsourced the sequence comparison task using finite state automata [21] . Similarly, the core idea of privacy preservation is to split the string-typed data and to return the aggregated results from subsection computations.
Beyond that, researchers have also explored secure outsourcing strategies for some similar sequence analysis algorithms (e.g., the search for homologous genes [30] , the search in genotype databases [31] , the genetic association statistics [32] , etc.). Currently, more and more variants and optimizations about the sequence comparison algorithm are emerging in endlessly. However, there is still a lack of feasible secure schemes in terms of the cyclic edit distance [33] , sequence alignment among reference genomes [34] , similarity metric learning [35] , etc.
In conclusion, almost all existing findings are presented as secure two-party computation protocols. In other words, the sensitive character sequences are split and outsourced respectively to two different cloud servers. Both of them are involved to execute the computation and to return the response to the end user. Such a kind of security protocol is always built on the non-colluding assumption between two or more entities, whose limitation is that the participants in these protocols should neither exchange the private share with each other nor publish it to another third party. At the same time, there is still substantial room for improvement in the number of interactive iterations and in the network overhead. For these reasons, the research target in this paper is to design a collusion-resistant secure outsourcing model for character sequence comparison in order to overcome the above deficiencies and promote an actual practical scheme.
D. FUTURE WORK
It is somewhat hard to extend the work in our paper to certain applications with multi-datasource. Firstly, two character sequences from different sources should be encrypted respectively with different keys. Secondly, three cost matrices should be encrypted together after being constructed by the negotiation between both sides. The security target is to complete sequence comparison on a single cloud server in the way of privacy preservation and to ensure that the stringtyped data of the end user on any side will not be arbitrarily stolen by the other user or the CSP.
With further analyses, we note that the ciphertext values encrypted by different system keys cannot be normally compared through AOPE. What is more, because both the cost matrix indexes and the final comparison results are shared between two sides, the character sequences on any side can be easily recovered by the other malicious user. Collusionresistant secure outsourcing schemes which are suitable for the multi-datasource sequence comparison have not yet been proposed. So they are expected to become one of our most important researches in the future to promote the practical applicability.
Taking into consideration all kinds of advantages or limitations in E-SC, future studies should pay more attention to improving the execution performance. In particular, if the end user requests to compare multiple character sequences simultaneously, the current common approach is to carry out pair-wise sequence comparison operation. Therefore, the remaining question to be discussed is whether there is a more optimized batch processing method.
Along with the continuous technical progress of character sequence analyses, reducing the computational and storage overhead of sequence comparison using special sequence structure [36] , [37] , or attempting to solve the secure outsourcing requirements of other algorithms [38] , will also be a feasible direction of future research, which is critical to the promotion of the development of public cloud security.
VII. CONCLUSION
Through the above summary, due to the problems about the collusion attacks that are widespread in the secure outsourcing of sequence comparison algorithms, this paper proposed the E-SC based on a single-server model. Individual private data are outsourced to the CSP in the encrypted form, which can preserve the data privacy of end users and support the effective computation of ciphertext values.
By designing an additive order preserving encryption algorithm as well as a salted hash algorithm, some functional modules of padding, partition, and expansion are deployed. The maneuverability of character sequences and the searchability of cost matrices are totally preserved without requiring the public cloud to modify its outsourcing architecture. In this way, the encrypted sequence comparison can be operated directly by a single server. The real practical E-SC finds out a good balance between security and execution performance. The results of outsourcing computations are accurate, while the time and space overhead are reasonable.
